Trade Liberalization and Domestic Vertical Integration: Evidence from China
Economics Seminar（2017-09）Topic:Trade Liberalization and Domestic Vertical Integration: Evidence from ChinaSpeaker:Qing LiuTime:Tuesday, November 7, 13:00—15:00Place:Room 216, Guanghua Building 2Abstract:In this study we examine the eﬀects of trade liberalization on domestic mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in China. In particular, we focus on domestic backward vertical integrations in whi...
Attitudinal Consequences of Random Experience: Evidence from Beijing Car Lott...
Economics Seminar（2017-08） Title: Attitudinal Consequences of Random Experience: Evidence from Beijing Car LotterySpeaker: Fangwen Lu, Renmin University of ChinaTime: Tuesday, June 20, 14:00-15:30Place: Room 217, Guanghua Building 2 AbstractWe conducted a representative survey of participants in Beijing car lottery. After controlling for the time of participation, whether winning a lotter...
Information Design: A Unified Perspective
Economics Seminar（2017-07） Title: Information Design: A Unified PerspectiveSpeaker: Stephen Morris, Princeton UniversityTime: Tuesday, June 13, 14:00-15:30Place: Room 217, Guanghua Building 2 AbstractFixing a game with uncertain payoffs, information design identifies the information structure and equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of an information designer. We show how this perspective...
Optimal Prize Allocation in Contests: The Role of Negative Prizes
In this paper, we investigate contest mechanisms with independent contestant private abilities. The contest designer has a fixed prize budget to extract effort from the contestants using both positive and negative prizes. We find that no mechanism can maximize the total effort. With exploding negative prizes, the designer can extract effort approaching the highest possible effort inducible when all contestants are of the maximum ability with certainty. With a bound K on the negative prizes, however, an optimal contest mechanism exists, implementable by a modified all-pay auction with an entry fee K and a minimum bid.
On the Paradox of Mediocracy
We consider an organization with a leader and a manager. The manager proposes an innovative but risky project to the leader. The leader decides whether to endorses the project or block it. The leader’s competence is privately known to the leader, and the market updates its belief about the leader’s type based on the observations of her action (endorsing the project or blocking it) and the outcome of her action. The leader could behave excessively conservatively when she is subject to reputation concerns. The manager decides whether to exert an effort to improve the intrinsic quality of the project, which benefits the organization. There exists a trade-off between the efficiency gain created by the leader’s competence and the manager’s incentive to supply effort.