Title: Information Design: A Unified Perspective
Speaker: Stephen Morris, Princeton University
Time: Tuesday, June 13, 14:00-15:30
Place: Room 217, Guanghua Building 2
Fixing a game with uncertain payoffs, information design identifies the information structure and equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of an information designer. We show how this perspective unifies existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures.
Stephen Morris is the Alexander Stewart 1886 Professor of Economics at Princeton University. He is a faculty member of the Department of Economics, the founding and current director of the William S. Dietrich Economic Theory Center and an affiliate of the Bendheim Center of Finance and the Research Program in Political Economy. Morris received his Ph.D. from Yale University in 1991 and was previously a faculty member at the University of Pennsylvania and Yale University. His research focuses foundations and applications of game theory and mechanism design, and in particular the role of incomplete information. Applications include finance, auctions, macroeconomics and political economy. He is a former Sloan Research Fellow, a Fellow of the Econometric Society, and an elected member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He served as editor of Econometrica from 2007-2011 and is currently the second Vice-President of Econometric Society.
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