Topic:Preemption Through Non-disclosure
Speaker:Ran Zhao, Chapman University
Time:Friday, June 15th, 10:00-11:30 a.m
Place:Room 217, Guanghua Building 2
An informed bidder can voluntarily disclose his private information on the value of an auctioned asset to rival bidders and the seller. We examine the informed bidder's optimal disclosure policy and the resulting consequences on the seller's payoff. We show that the informed bidder strategically withholds information to create a winner's curse for rival bidders, which has a preemptive effect on the rival's participation. Taking into account this strategic response, we show that increased competition among bidders may reduce the seller's payoff- a surprising result that is contrary to the common belief that bidder competition generally increases the seller's payoff.
Dr. Ran Zhao joined Chapman University in 2014. She received her Master of Science and Ph.D. in Accounting from Carnegie Mellon University. She do experimental studies and analytical studies in areas of corporate governance, information disclosure, production market competition and coordination games. She has published in the Review of Accounting Studies, Contemporary Accounting ResearchandAmerican Economic Review.
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