Topic:Do Large Shareholders Separate the Roles of CEO and Board Chairman for Expropriations? Evidence from Pyramidal Business Groups in China
Speaker:Huilong Liu，University of International Business and Economics
Time:Friday, December 15th, 14:00-15:30 p.m
Place:Room 217, Guanghua Building 2
This paper first proposes that the separation of the roles of CEO and board chairman is a result of, rather than a solution to large shareholder agency problem. We provide evidence for this view through examining the probabilities of CEO duality in pyramidal groups and their consequences. We find that the probability of CEO duality is negatively associated with the number of pyramid layers between the company and its ultimate controller, this relationship is more obvious when large shareholders have more power to manipulate the formation of CEO duality; The probability of CEO duality is negatively associated with large shareholder expropriation, the number of pyramid layers and the level of large shareholder expropriation are positively related, and this positive relationship is especially prominent when the CEO and the chairman are not the same individual. Further analysis reveals that CEO duality improves firm performance in cases of more pyramid layers and dampens it in cases of fewer pyramid layers. These findings indicate that large shareholders separate the roles of CEO and board chairman for their expropriation. This paper enriches the theory and evidence on the formation mechanism of CEO duality as well as on the question that how CEO duality affects corporate governance, and initiates the exploration of the corporate governance of pyramidal business groups from the perspective of CEO duality.
刘慧龙，对外经济贸易大学国际商学院副教授，北京大学光华管理学院会计学博士，主要研究方向为公司治理、公司财务，在Journal of Business Ethics、《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《金融研究》、《会计研究》、《中国工业经济》、《审计研究》等刊物上发表论文20余篇，主持国家自然科学基金2项、教育部人文社科基金项1项。
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